

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 26-11136
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEDARIOUS LAWRENCE,

a.k.a. Jerome Mitchell,
a.k.a. Jerney Leonhard,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00448-LMM-CCB-1

Before ABUDU, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Upon revocation of his supervised release for a second time, the district court sentenced Sedarious Lawrence to one year and one day of imprisonment. He now appeals, challenging the district court's findings at his revocation hearing and the reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Lawrence was sentenced to ninety-six months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release for possessing a stolen firearm. When Lawrence began his supervised release term in March 2024, he had to comply with certain conditions, including: (1) not committing another federal, state, or local crime, (2) refraining from unlawful possession and use of controlled substances, (3) residing at a place authorized by his probation officer, and (4) not knowingly leaving the Northern District of Georgia without first receiving permission from either the court or his probation officer.

A. First Supervised Release Revocation

Less than a year after Lawrence completed his custodial sentence, the district court revoked his supervised release. Lawrence admitted to two violations—failing to live at his approved residence and knowingly leaving the Northern District without permission. Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the district court also concluded that the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawrence had committed a third violation—physically assaulting the man with whom Lawrence believed his wife to be having an affair. Lawrence was sentenced to

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ten months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. The district court reimposed the same relevant supervised release conditions with two additional requirements, including that Lawrence shall “have no contact with [his wife] unless [Lawrence] ha[d] permission from [his] probation officer.”

Lawrence began his new supervised release term in September 2025. He thereafter moved to modify the term of his supervised release requiring that he have no contact with his wife, but the district court denied Lawrence’s requests.

B. Second Supervised Release Revocation

In late February 2026, a U.S. Probation officer again petitioned for revocation of Lawrence’s supervised release, alleging that he tested positive for THC on four occasions, and that he contacted his wife without permission. As it related to the second alleged violation, the probation officer indicated that Lawrence had reported on November 20, 2025, that he had been living with his wife since late October. The probation officer explained to Lawrence that he could not reside with his wife without court approval, but he still refused to move out, as he could not afford to relocate. Lawrence ultimately provided his probation officer with an address for his friend’s home, and he was given permission to move to this address. However, data from an ankle monitor Lawrence was required to wear for pending state charges showed that he went to his wife’s house every day for nearly a week in February 2026—after he had purportedly moved out—each time for several hours.

At a revocation hearing, Lawrence admitted the conduct alleged in the petition but denied the willfulness of his violation of the no-contact condition. The government presented testimony from Lawrence's probation officer to support its theory that Lawrence's contact with his wife was not an accident. To rebut the government's assertions, Lawrence and his aunt testified. Following this testimony and brief argument from the parties, the district court found that Lawrence committed the first alleged violation of unlawfully using a controlled substance, as he had admitted.

As to the second alleged violation, the court found that the evidence showed that Lawrence's contact with his wife was willful and intentional, explaining that this "thoughtful" condition was imposed for the safety of Lawrence, his wife, and the community. In relevant part, the court emphasized that the contact between Lawrence and his wife occurred over a prolonged, five-month period and that Lawrence continued to return to his wife's home even after finding another place to stay. It also explained that, despite Lawrence's arguments to the contrary, it was not his probation officer's job to find him alternative housing.

The court then announced that Lawrence's advisory guideline range was eight to fourteen months of imprisonment, and both parties agreed with this calculation. After the court heard the parties' sentencing recommendations, Lawrence allocuted, explaining the circumstances that led to him having contact with his wife and how he had been working to better his life.

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The district court revoked Lawrence's supervised release and imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day of imprisonment. The court explained that it was "ironic" that Lawrence blamed his wife for much of his conduct during his allocution, which is what he did at the last revocation hearing that resulted in the imposition of the no-contact condition at issue. It elaborated that Lawrence failed to take responsibility for his actions and, instead, placed "a lot of blame on other people and circumstances."

The court acknowledged that Lawrence was able to do "good" things while on supervised release, including finding work and a stable place to live. However, it remarked that Lawrence told different stories throughout the hearing about why he had been in contact with his wife and described even more instances of unauthorized contact during his allocution than previously raised. The court explained that it told Lawrence "not to do something" when it previously revoked his supervised release but he "ha[d] [his] own plans and ways of going about things" that violated the court's conditions. The court further opined that Lawrence was "someone [who was] going to continue to do [what was] in [his] best interest" and did not find that he was "someone that [was amenable] to complying" with the conditions of supervision. The court also noted that Lawrence was not allowed to use marijuana, and while there were some allegations that he had a medical marijuana card, neither the court nor probation had seen proof. The court concluded by stating that the previously articulated willfulness findings contributed to its determination that the imposed sentence was appropriate and consistent with the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

Lawrence objected to the district court's willfulness finding and the substantive reasonableness of the imposed sentence. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's revocation of supervised release, as well as the substantive reasonableness of sentences imposed upon revocation, for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. King*, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023) (sentence); *United States v. Vandergrift*, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (revocation). A district court's findings of fact made during a revocation hearing "are binding on this Court unless clearly erroneous." *United States v. Almand*, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation modified).

III. DISCUSSION

A district court may revoke a defendant's supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment if it "finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). On appeal, Lawrence challenges the district court's determination that he violated the no-contact condition of his supervised release as well as the substantive reasonableness of his imprisonment sentence. We will address each argument in turn.

A. Revocation of Supervised Release

Lawrence first takes issue with the district court's factual determinations made in revoking his supervised release. He argues that our Court should read a mens rea element in to § 3583(e) and

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that the rule of lenity favors viewing the statute in the light most favorable to him. As it relates to the specifics of his case, Lawrence asserts that the district court failed to weigh certain facts—including his indigent status—in reaching its conclusion that his contact with his wife was willful.

We will assume, without deciding, that the district court clearly erred in finding that Lawrence willfully violated the no-contact condition. Even so, the error would not be reversible. That is because the district court needed to find only *one* violation of the supervised release conditions to support its revocation determination. *See Vandergrift*, 754 F.3d at 1307 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s supervised release, despite his argument that he did not commit two of the five alleged violations, because he pleaded guilty to the other alleged violations).

Here, Lawrence admitted to the first violation alleged in the revocation petition—that he unlawfully used a controlled substance and tested positive for THC on four occasions. He does not challenge the validity of this admission on appeal. As such, any possible error in determining the willfulness of Lawrence’s conduct regarding the second violation was harmless. *See United States v. Brown*, 656 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep. 1981) (finding it unnecessary “to decide the claims of error advanced in regard to . . . three grounds for revocation” where the defendant’s “conviction for possession of a controlled substance serve[d] as an adequate basis for the discretionary action of the district court”).

We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to revoke Lawrence's supervised release.

B. Reasonableness of Sentence

To determine a defendant's sentence following a revocation of supervised release, the district court must consider certain factors set forth in § 3553(a). *United States v. Sweeting*, 437 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2006). Those § 3553(a) factors require the sentencing court to consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, (3) the applicable guideline range, and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(D), (4); 3583(e). Additional factors for consideration include (1) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, and the need to (2) deter criminal conduct, (3) protect the public from the defendant's future criminal conduct, (4) avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, and (5) provide restitution to the victims. *Id.* §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), (5)–(7); 3583(e).

Lawrence contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to “genuinely [consider] the nature and circumstances of the offense,” including his indigency and his “tireless efforts” to improve his situation, and unreasonably focused on his disregard for the court's previous orders. We disagree.

The weight given to the sentencing factors lies within the district court's sound discretion. *See King*, 57 F.4th at 1339; *United States v. Rosales-Bruno*, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). As such,

the court was permitted to attach greater weight to the need for deterrence, given Lawrence’s status as a repeat violator, over any other factors discussed at sentencing. The district court was not required to articulate its consideration of all of Lawrence’s mitigating arguments, especially where the “record reflects that [it] considered all of the [relevant] factors.” *United States v. Hayden*, 119 F.4th 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2024). Indeed, while the court did not expressly discuss Lawrence’s housing search or his indigency when imposing sentence, it heard lengthy testimony on the matter and credited the fact that, while on supervised release, Lawrence found a stable place to live and obtained two jobs. *See United States v. Amedeo*, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the court’s failure to discuss every piece of mitigating evidence does not “mean[] that the court erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider [such] evidence”).

Lawrence’s sentence of twelve months and one day of imprisonment is also within the applicable guideline range, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), and well below the two-year statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Both of these factors are further indicative of the sentence’s reasonableness. *See Sweeting*, 437 F.3d at 1107; *United States v. Sotelo*, 130 F.4th 1229, 1245 (11th Cir. 2025).

For these reasons, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [relevant] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” *United States v. Irey*, 612 F.3d 1160,

1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of Lawrence's sentence.

IV. CONCLUSION

We **AFFIRM** the judgment and sentence imposed upon the second revocation of Lawrence's supervised release.