

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 26-10835
Non-Argument Calendar

CRYSTAL MAYE,

*Trustee,
Plaintiff-Appellant,*

versus

BREVARD COUNTY TAX COLLECTOR,
OCEAN TAX DEED INVESTMENT LLC,
BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cv-01343-AGM-DCI

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Crystal Maye, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's order striking her inquiry regarding when her case would be presented to a grand jury.

The appealed order is not final because it did not end the litigation on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; *see CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City*, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a final decision ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute its judgment).

The order is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because nothing suggests that the order would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment or that delaying review of the order would imperil a substantial public interest.¹ *See Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal*, 22 F.4th 979, 989 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that, among other requirements, an order must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine); *Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter*, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009). Nor does the district court's subsequent dismissal of Maye's amended complaint cure

¹ To the extent that Maye's inquiry may be construed as a motion for a jury trial, the order striking the filing is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it does not resolve an issue separate from and collateral to the merits of the action. *See Howard v. Parisian, Inc.*, 807 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1987) (observing that the denial of a motion for a jury trial is not final or appealable under the collateral order doctrine); *see generally Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd.*, 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that pro se filings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are liberally construed).

26-10835

Opinion of the Court

3

her premature appeal. *See Robinson v. Tanner*, 798 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a subsequent final judgment cures a premature appeal only when the appeal is from an otherwise final order dismissing a claim or party).

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.