

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-13498
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WOODROW SCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cr-00017-JRH-BKE-2

Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Woodrow Scott appeals the 235-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. He argues

that the district court erred at sentencing by applying an enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines for a leadership role. Alternatively, he says that even if the enhancement applied, the district court abused its discretion by not granting a downward variance.

The government has moved to dismiss Scott's appeal because the parties entered into a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver. Scott's plea agreement said that he "entirely waive[d] his right to a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence on any ground." Doc. 538 at 6.¹ The plea agreement stated that the only exceptions to this waiver were "if (1) the Court enters a sentence above the statutory maximum, (2) the Court enters a sentence above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range found to apply by the Court at sentencing; or (3) the Government appeals the sentence." *Id.* The next provision in the plea agreement said that Scott was waiving his right to "collaterally attack his conviction and sentence on any ground" except for ineffective assistance of counsel. *Id.*

We enforce appeal waivers that a defendant made knowingly and voluntarily, unless doing so "would result in a miscarriage of justice." *Hunter v. United States*, 608 U.S. 713, 727 (2026); see *United States v. Bushert*, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating the knowing and voluntary requirement).

Here, after careful consideration, we conclude that the appeal waiver bars Scott's appeal. The record, viewed as a whole,

¹ "Doc." numbers refer to the district court's docket entries.

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shows that Scott knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence. During the change-of-plea hearing, the district court specifically questioned Scott about the waiver of his direct appeal rights, noting the three exceptions that would allow him to appeal, and about his waived right to collaterally attack his conviction, noting the only exception that would allow him to make a collateral attack. The district court then asked Scott whether he understood the two appeal waivers in his plea agreement, to which Scott answered, “Yes, sir.” Doc. 617 at 8.

Furthermore, we see no indication that any of the exceptions to the appeal waiver in the plea agreement apply here. The court did not impose a sentence above the statutory maximum or above the range it calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, nothing in the record before us indicates that enforcing the appeal waiver here will result in a miscarriage of justice. *See Hunter*, 608 U.S. at 727.

Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in the plea agreement is **GRANTED**.