

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-13483
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BRADY LAVICK ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:94-cr-04045-RH-MAL-1

Before ABUDU, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Brady Lavick Adams is a federal prisoner serving life imprisonment for kidnapping. He now appeals, challenging the district

court's denial of his request for compassionate release. After careful review, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Over thirty years ago, Adams's estranged wife, S.A., left him and moved to her cousin's apartment near Atlanta, Georgia. Misrepresenting his identity, Adams was able to locate S.A., broke into the apartment, threatened S.A.'s cousin with a revolver, and forced S.A. outside. When S.A. resisted, Adams struck her with the gun and then shot her when she attempted to flee. Adams then placed S.A. in his vehicle and drove her from Georgia to Florida.

Although S.A. was bleeding, vomiting, and drifting in and out of consciousness from the assault, Adams denied her medical treatment for more than twenty-four hours. According to S.A., in addition to the physical violence he had already inflicted, Adams also sexually assaulted her at a motel during the trip. The FBI was eventually able to locate Adams and S.A., but Adams released her and surrendered only after a twelve-hour standoff, during which Adams threatened to kill S.A.

S.A. was gravely injured as a result of Adams's actions. She was initially given only a fifty-percent chance of survival, but ultimately recovered after undergoing five surgeries.

A jury convicted Adams of kidnapping S.A., using and carrying a firearm during the kidnapping, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The district court credited S.A.'s testimony regarding the sexual assault and sentenced Adams to life imprisonment for kidnapping, a concurrent 360-month sentence on the felon-in-

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possession count, and a consecutive 60-month sentence for the § 924(c) conviction. Adams appealed only his kidnapping conviction, and we affirmed. *United States v. Adams*, 83 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996).

In the years that followed, Adams pursued several collateral challenges to his convictions and sentences. Ultimately, the district court reduced Adams’s sentence on his felon-in-possession conviction to 120 months of imprisonment and vacated his § 924(c) conviction. But the court declined to revisit Adams’s life sentence for kidnapping.

In September 2025, Adams moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He asserted that changes in law created a gross sentencing disparity, challenged the finding that he sexually assaulted S.A., invoked his mental condition and rehabilitation, and alleged that a correctional officer had abused him in prison. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Adams had not alleged exhaustion, had not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, remained a danger to S.A. and the community, and the current sentence complied with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Adams timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Harris*, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making

the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A district court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) only if three conditions are satisfied: (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason supports a reduction, (2) the reduction would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement, and (3) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors favor relief. *United States v. Tinker*, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). Section 1B1.13 requires the court to determine that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2).

A court need not address these requirements in any particular order, and the defendant’s failure to satisfy any one of them forecloses compassionate release. *Tinker*, 14 F.4th at 1237–38; *United States v. Giron*, 15 F.4th 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 2021). And here, even assuming Adams properly exhausted his administrative remedies and demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release, the district court still did not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release given that Adams remained a danger to S.A. and the community.

In assessing dangerousness, a court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger that release would pose. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)–(4); *see* U.S.S.G. § 1B1.12(a)(2). In this case, the district

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court permissibly relied on several of these factors. Specifically, the court considered the “egregious” circumstances of Adams’s offense, the seriousness and depth of Adams’s criminal history, and the specific danger he may present to S.A.

In this case, Adams broke into a residence with a revolver, threatened S.A.’s cousin, forcibly removed S.A., struck and shot her when she resisted, transported her across state lines, and denied her medical treatment for more than twenty-four hours. He also entered the case with convictions for child molestation, assault and battery, and felonious assault, as well as a history of threatening or violent conduct toward women, including S.A. and her family. Although Adams contends that his age, health, and rehabilitation render him less of a threat, the facts outlined above reasonably support the district court’s conclusion that Adams continued to pose a danger, including a specific danger to S.A. *Harris*, 989 F.3d at 911.

In short, the court reviewed Adams’s motion, considered his history and the circumstances of the offense, and concluded that he remained dangerous. That conclusion fell within the district court’s permissible range of choice and was therefore not an abuse of discretion. *Id.* at 911–12. Adams’s attempt on appeal to recast his compassionate-release motion as a collateral challenge to his convictions based on allegedly false testimony and withheld evidence does not undermine the district court’s independent dangerousness determination.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, we **AFFIRM** the denial of Adams's § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.¹

¹ Adams has also filed multiple motions with our Court. His request to correct a typographical error in his brief is GRANTED. His request to supplement the record on appeal with medical documents indicating that he is legally blind is DENIED. *See CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City*, 235 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000); *Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc.*, 341 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). His motion for oral argument is also DENIED. *See* 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b).