

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-12974
Non-Argument Calendar

JOSE YEYILLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GREENBERG TRAUIG, P.A.,

in its individual capacity and in its official capacity,
jointly and severally liable,

JOHN LONDOT, ESQ.,

in his individual capacity and in his official capacity,
jointly and severally liable,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-21891-DPG

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

José Yeyille, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's orders dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. After careful review, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2025, Yeyille filed a 169-page pro se complaint against Greenberg Traurig, P.A., and John Londot, Esq. (collectively, the "GT Defendants"), alleging various violations of his First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The facts underlying this action appear to be as follows.

In 2022, a Florida circuit court dismissed a civil suit Yeyille had filed against his deceased mother's physician. When Florida's Third District Court of Appeal ("Third DCA") affirmed the dismissal without a written opinion, Yeyille made several filings disparaging the judges who had ruled against him. The Third DCA barred Yeyille, who was then a licensed attorney, from making any further pro se filings and referred him to the Florida Bar for disciplinary proceedings. After those disciplinary proceedings began, Yeyille filed a complaint against the Bar in state court. The GT Defendants represented the Bar in that action, which was ultimately dismissed. During this time, Yeyille also filed suit against the GT Defendants. The state court dismissed this action and declared Yeyille a vexatious litigant.

In the instant federal complaint, Yeyille purportedly raised a total of twenty claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, *Bivens v. Six*

25-12974

Opinion of the Court

3

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and a cause of action of his own creation—a “Citizen José Action.” In those numerous claims, Yeyille appeared to contend, among other things, that (1) per curiam affirmances without formal written opinions were a part of a “discriminatory scheme against the indigent” and minority pro se parties; (2) the GT Defendants “buy” and “own” various state and federal judges; and (3) the GT Defendants are an “alter ego” of the Florida Supreme Court.

On the GT Defendants’ motion, the district court dismissed Yeyille’s complaint with prejudice. In relevant part, the court observed that the instant complaint was materially identical to the one filed in Yeyille’s state court case against the GT defendants, with the exception of “100 extra pages of offensive, antisemitic vitriol—unrelated to any legitimate cause or claim.” It therefore concluded that Yeyille’s complaint was subject to dismissal as an impermissible shotgun pleading. The court explained that the complaint was “filled with quotations from . . . antisemitic publications, photos of politicians and judges, and rambling allegations without any clear connection to [Yeyille’s] claims,” which was “not a ‘short and plain statement’ as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” The court also took judicial notice of the court documents filed in the relevant state cases and further concluded that the instant action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Yeyille thereafter moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), asserting that the district court's order included legal and factual errors. In relevant part, he objected to the finding that the complaint was a shotgun pleading, suggesting that this Circuit's application of the standard was improperly heightened and biased. Yeyille also asserted that the dismissal order violated his First Amendment right to free speech, because, in Yeyille's view, the court dismissed his complaint due to the "offensive" language contained therein. Yeyille was also critical of the district judge who presided over his case and requested that the judge be replaced.

The district court denied Yeyille's motion by paperless order. It concluded that Yeyille "provide[d] no new legitimate basis for his requested relief" and found no reason to transfer the case to a new judge.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion both a district court's dismissal of a complaint on shotgun-pleading grounds and denial of a Rule 59(e) motion. *Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets*, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018) (shotgun pleading); *Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 953 F.3d 707, 719 (11th Cir. 2020) (Rule 59(e) motion). Under this deferential standard, we must affirm unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal standard. *Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc.*, 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain a short and plain statement of a claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified). A plaintiff must also state the claims “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Complaints that violate these rules are referred to as shotgun pleadings. *Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.*, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). We have identified “four . . . categories of shotgun pleadings,” which include complaints that (1) contain “multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts,” (2) are “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action,” (3) do “not separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief,” or (4) assert “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions.” *Id.* at 1321–23.

“The unifying characteristic” of these deficient pleadings is their failure “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” *Id.* at 1323. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Yeyille’s complaint met these criteria.

All 20 of the claims asserted in Yeyille’s complaint incorporated by reference every factual allegation set forth in the first 115 paragraphs of the filing. The 169-page complaint was also full of conclusory, vague, and unsubstantiated allegations “not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” *Id.* at 1322. Specifically, the complaint included numerous pictures, used antisemitic rhetoric, made claims that the GT Defendants “own” the Florida judiciary system, and alleged acts of domestic and international terrorism. The disorganized form of Yeyille’s complaint left both the GT Defendants and the district court without adequate notice of the claims he wished to pursue or what plausible facts he believed entitled him to relief. *See id.* at 1323; *Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc.*, 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that shotgun pleadings are “never plain because it is impossible to comprehend which specific factual allegations the plaintiff intends to support which of [their] causes of action, or how they do so”).

We note that, generally, a pro se plaintiff must receive at least one opportunity to amend the complaint before it is dismissed with prejudice, and that did not occur in this case. *See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, Yeyille never asked to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies, despite his numerous filings before the district court. *See id.* at 1291 (explaining that a district court need not provide a chance to amend where there is “a clear indication that the plaintiff does not want to amend his complaint” or where “a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim” (citation modified)); *see also Finnegan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue*, 926 F.3d 1261,

25-12974

Opinion of the Court

7

1271–72 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that this Court will generally not consider issues not raised before the district court).

Yeyille also does not argue on appeal that he should have been entitled to amend his complaint before the district court dismissed it with prejudice. *See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.*, 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that issues not prominently raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned). Rather, Yeyille explicitly states in his brief that “he will **not** amend [his] Complaint.” We therefore decline to consider whether allowing Yeyille leave to amend would have been futile—that is, whether a more carefully drafted complaint may have been able to state a plausible claim for relief against the GT Defendants. *See Woldeab*, 885 F.3d at 1291.

In short, the leniency we afford pro se litigants is not unlimited, *Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd.*, 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014), and we do not require district courts to “parse” through “incomprehensible allegations,” *Est. of Bass*, 947 F.3d at 1358. Shotgun pleadings—such as Yeyille’s filing in this case—“waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” *Vibe Micro*, 898 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified). The district court therefore acted within its broad “inherent authority to control its docket” in dismissing Yeyille’s complaint with prejudice. *Id.* (citation modified). And because the district court’s shotgun-pleading determination presents an independent basis for affirmance, we need not consider the parties’ arguments

related to the district court's alternative finding that the doctrine of res judicata barred the instant action.

Since we find no reversible error in the district court's dismissal order, we likewise conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Yeyille's Rule 59(e) motion. *Arthur v. King*, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that "the only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact" (citation modified)). While Yeyille maintains on appeal that the district court violated the First Amendment in dismissing his complaint, this argument fails because there is no evidence that the court dismissed the complaint due to the content of Yeyille's speech. Rather, the court found dismissal appropriate because it could not logically connect any of Yeyille's factual allegations to his asserted claims due to "offensive, antisemitic vitriol" muddying nearly 100 pages of the complaint—a primary characteristic of a shotgun pleading. *See Weiland*, 792 F.3d at 1323. And to the extent Yeyille sought to use his Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate the merits of his complaint, the district court correctly concluded that such arguments could not provide a basis for relief. *Arthur*, 500 F.3d at 1343 ("A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." (citation modified)).

IV. CONCLUSION

We **AFFIRM** the dismissal of Yeyille's complaint and denial of his Rule 59(e) motion.