

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-12841
Non-Argument Calendar

TONYA ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PALM BEACH COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:25-cv-80036-AMC

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In December 2024, Tonya Robertson, through counsel, initiated suit in Florida state court against her former employer, the

Board of County Commissioners for Palm Beach County. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and moved to dismiss the complaint. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion but allowed Robertson leave to amend. Robertson thereafter filed an amended complaint, naming only Palm Beach County and raising claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. On the County's motion, the district court dismissed Robertson's amended complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that the amended complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading. "[A]s an alternative matter," the court further concluded that Robertson's amended complaint failed to state plausible claims for either disability discrimination or retaliation.

Robertson now appeals from the district court's dismissal order. To obtain reversal of this judgment "based on multiple, independent grounds, [Robertson] must convince us that every stated ground for the judgment against [her] is incorrect." *Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.*, 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). While Robertson fully develops a challenge to the district court's shotgun-pleading determination, she fails to adequately challenge the court's findings as to the merits of her claims. *See id.* at 681 ("A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims." (citation modified)). The section of Robertson's initial brief dedicated to this issue consists primarily of

a recitation of the relevant legal standards followed by the conclusory statements that she “adequately pled” her claims and that her “Amended Complaint sets forth facts, if proven at trial, that would support a verdict for [her] for disability discrimination and retaliation.”

Robertson’s acknowledgement that this issue exists without explaining how her amended complaint meets the relevant pleading requirements is insufficient to preserve any challenge to the district court’s rulings. *See id.* (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”); *see also Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.*, 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal.”). While Robertson elaborates on this issue in her reply brief, these “arguments come too late.” *Sapuppo*, 739 F.3d at 683; *see also Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc.*, 528 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We decline to address an argument advanced by an appellant for the first time in a reply brief.”).

We conclude that Robertson has not properly challenged the lower court’s determination that her amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. She has therefore “abandoned an issue on which [she] had to prevail in order to obtain reversal.” *United States v. King*, 751 F.3d 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014). “[I]t follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” *Sapuppo*, 739 F.3d at

680. Accordingly, we **AFFIRM** the district court's dismissal of Robertson's amended complaint.