

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the  
United States Court of Appeals  
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-11455  
Non-Argument Calendar

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LIAM TORRES,

an individual, on behalf of himself,

*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

STATE SOCIETY OF CHRISTOPHER NATION,

*Plaintiff,*

*versus*

SAMUEL BRIAN BOUNDY,

MARTIN O'KEEFFE,

KENNETH COMPTON,

KIMBERLY SHARPE BYRD,

LAURALEE G. WESTINE, et al.,

*Defendants-Appellees.*

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Florida  
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cv-02936-WFJ-AEP

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Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Liam Torres appeals the district court’s dismissal of his suit as frivolous and its denial of his post-judgment motion for reconsideration. After careful review, we affirm.

Torres filed the instant suit in 2024, alleging that he was a “minister” and “sovereign member” of “an internationally recognized sovereign micro-state operating under principles of religious self-governance and international law.”<sup>1</sup> He argued the defendants had defamed this “micro-state” by referring to it as a “sovereign citizen organization” and that various prior legal proceedings in

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<sup>1</sup> Consistent with his initial complaint, Torres purports to appeal on behalf of the “State Society of Christopher Nation.” However, Torres, as a non-attorney, cannot represent the interests of another party. See *Timson v. Sampson*, 518 F.3d 870, 873 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining 28 U.S.C. § 1654 “provide[s] a personal right” to proceed *pro se* “that does not extend to the representation of the interests of others”); *Guajardo v. Luna*, 432 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1970) (“In short, the requirement that only licensed lawyers may represent others in court is a reasonable rule that does not offend any constitutional guarantee.”); see also *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (*en banc*) (holding that decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are “binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit”). We therefore only consider Torres’s personal claims on appeal.

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state and federal court had caused various constitutional violations and other harms.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Torres's claims were frivolous and repetitive (as Torres had brought similar claims in the past); the complaint violated FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); and they were protected by various immunities. After briefing, the district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the suit was Torres's "third frivolous" suit "against Pasco County and its employees." It also explained that the complaint failed to state a claim, and certain defendants were protected by judicial immunity. Still, the court allowed Torres an opportunity to amend his complaint, but warned him that, if the amended complaint "resemble[d] the present one," it would be "unlikely to succeed."

Torres moved for reconsideration, FED. R. CIV. P. 59, and he attached a proposed amended complaint to his motion. That complaint was, as relevant, comparable to the original complaint as it, again, contended that Torres was a "minister" of a micro-state and that he, by contract, had exchanged his right to vote for Florida's recognition of his separation from the State. The district court denied Torres's motion for reconsideration, concluding that the proposed amendment would be futile. It explained that each of Torres's frivolous suits "expressed the view that [Torres] had excused, disclaimed, or excepted himself from civil governance, and was his own governing body, or part of a governing body that was different from and alien to the County where he lived, or different from the State of Florida." The court explained that these claims

were not cognizable, so the case would “remain dismissed.” Torres timely appealed.

District courts have inherent authority to dismiss frivolous suits. See *Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc.*, 695 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1983). We review a dismissal for frivolity for abuse of discretion. *Bilal v. Driver*, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).<sup>2</sup> “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” *Id.* The abuse of discretion standard is deferential, as it “allows for a ‘range of choice for the district court,’ as long as that choice is not a ‘clear error of judgment.’” *United States v. Beaufls*, 160 F.4th 1147, 1163 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting *Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury)*, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)). We construe *pro se* pleadings and briefs liberally. See *Wright v. Newsome*, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986).

The district court did not abuse its discretion. While Torres argues his complaint has been mischaracterized as presenting ‘sovereign citizen’ claims, the most apt terminology is not the relevant question. The question is whether the lawsuit was frivolous.<sup>3</sup> “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts

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<sup>2</sup> We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration under the same standard. *United States v. Simms*, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004).

<sup>3</sup> The terminology is of no moment because, even if we were to agree with Torres that his claims are distinguishable from classic “sovereign citizen” claims, both types of claims are frivolous. See, e.g., *United States v. Sterling*, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (describing sovereign citizen claims); *United States v. Williams*, 29 F.4th 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (same).

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alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The district court correctly concluded that Torres’s complaint, which involves claims that Torres is the “minister” and “sovereign member” of “an internationally recognized sovereign micro-state operating under principles of religious self-governance and international law” so qualifies—it is “irrational” and “wholly incredible.” *Id.* Moreover, Torres had brought similar claims before, and “a litigant’s history of bringing unmeritorious litigation” also suggests frivolousness. *Bilal*, 251 F.3d at 1350. In these circumstances, the district court acted within its “range of choice” in dismissing the case. *Beaufils*, 160 F.4th at 1163.<sup>4</sup>

**AFFIRMED.**

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<sup>4</sup> The district court also did not err in denying Torres’s requests for reconsideration or to amend his complaint, since the amended complaint was still frivolous. *Simms*, 385 F.3d at 1356; *see also St. Louis Condo. Ass’n. v. Rockhill Ins. Co.*, 5 F.4th 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that a court may grant a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration only when presented with newly discovered evidence or a manifest legal or factual error).