[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-11345

Non-Argument Calendar

JANE DOE, a.k.a. K.B.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

G6 HOSPITALITY LLC,
G6 HOSPITALITY FRANCHISING, LLC,
G6 HOSPITALITY IP, LLC,
G6 HOSPITALITY PROPERTY, LLC,
G6 HOSPITALITY PURCHASING, LLC, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

HARE KRISHNA SAVANNAH HOTEL, LLC,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-02597-TRJ

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The plaintiff, who is anonymously proceeding as "K.B.," appeals from the district court's order entered on November 6, 2024. That order dismissed K.B.'s claims brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") against defendants G6 Hospitality, LLC; G6 Hospitality Franchising, LLC; G6 Hospitality IP, LLC; G6 Hospitality Property, LLC; G6 Hospitality Purchasing, LLC; Motel 6 Operating, LP (collectively, "the G6 defendants") and declined to dismiss her claims against Hare Krishna Savannah Hotel, LLC ("Hare Krishna"). The district court certified the dismissal of K.B.'s claims against the G6 defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and entered a partial final judgment in favor of those defendants.

A jurisdictional question asked the parties to address whether the district court's Rule 54(b) certification was proper. Both parties agree that the Rule 54(b) certification was proper because the dismissal of K.B.'s claims against the G6 defendants was

a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b), and the district court's determination that there was no just reason to delay an immediate appeal is not clearly unreasonable.

We disagree and conclude that the district court's Rule 54(b) certification was improper. Specifically, the district court's determination that there was no just reason to delay an immediate appeal was an abuse of discretion. The district court based its determination on (1) the desire to avoid duplicative discovery and district court litigation that would result from declining to permit an immediate appeal, and (2) the equitable concern about any hardship that K.B. would suffer as a victim of sex trafficking from being subjected to such extensive proceedings. While these are valid administrative and equitable concerns, they do not rise to the level of the "pressing needs" that we have identified as supporting Rule 54(b) certification. *See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ.*, 114 F.3d 162, 166 (11th Cir. 1997); *Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.*, 21 F.4th 714, 722-23 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding that Rule 54(b) certification was warranted because the case concerned multiple consolidated related cases, was at an early stage in the litigation, had a large number of defendants, and had substantial discovery remaining to be completed); *Chapman v. Dunn*, 129 F.4th 1307, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2025) (concluding that Rule 54(b) certification was warranted because resolution of the unadjudicated claims was indefinitely delayed and the *pro se* appellant was facing serious health problems).

The concerns raised by the district court and the parties are more like the desire to avoid the usual "inconvenience" of

obtaining a final judgment before bringing an appeal rather than the type of pressing concerns that we identified in *Red Roof* and *Chapman*. *See Peden v. Stephens*, 50 F.4th 972, 979 (11th Cir. 2022); *Red Roof*, 21 F.4th at 722-23; *Chapman*, 129 F.4th at 1314-15. The fact that the unadjudicated and adjudicated claims are factually and legally intertwined also indicates that Rule 54(b) certification is not proper here. *See Ebrahimi*, 114 F.3d at 167 ("[W]hen the factual underpinnings of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined, courts should be hesitant to employ Rule 54(b).").

Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.