NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-10949

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

COREY MYRICK,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00064-MSS-CPT-1

No. 25-10953

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

COREY MYRICK,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00064-MSS-CPT-1

Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

We previously granted the Government's motion to dismiss Corey Myrick's appeal based on the sentence-appeal waiver in his plea agreement. *United States v. Myrick*, No. 25-10949 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025) (unpublished). The Supreme Court granted Myrick's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of *Hunter v. United States*, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). *Myrick v. United States*, 146 S. Ct. 2795 (2026). We directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing *Hunter*. Having considered those submissions, we again conclude that Myrick's appeal waiver is enforceable and dismiss his appeal.

I.

Myrick pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). His plea agreement contained a sentence-appeal waiver under which he waived the right to appeal his sentence "on any ground, including

the ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable guidelines range." The waiver was subject to four exceptions, none of which is applicable here.

At sentencing, the district court determined that Myrick had a total offense level of 25 and a criminal-history category of IV, producing an advisory guideline range of 84 to 105 months' imprisonment. The court sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment. Myrick nevertheless appealed, challenging every enhancement used in calculating his guideline range. He argues that the district court failed to make sufficient factual or legal findings to support those enhancements. Myrick previously argued that without the enhancements his total offense level would have been 17 and his guideline range would have been 37 to 46 months. After remand and on this current appeal Myrick appears to only challenge two of the enhancements. Without those two, his offense level would have been 19 and his guideline range would have been 46 to 57 months.

II.

A sentence-appeal waiver ordinarily will be enforced if the government shows that the defendant entered it knowingly and voluntarily. *United States v. Bushert*, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). In *Hunter*, the Supreme Court held that an otherwise valid appeal waiver will not be enforced when doing so "would result in a miscarriage of justice." *Hunter*, 608 U.S. at 716. That exception is narrow. A waiver may be set aside only when "the sentence

is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute." *Id.* And the error must be "obvious—not one a judge could reasonably make." *Id.*

The Court in *Hunter* emphasized that this exception is reserved for extreme cases implicating the basic integrity of the judicial process. Examples include a sentence exceeding the punishment authorized by statute, a sentence resting on a blatant constitutional violation such as the consideration of race, or a sentence imposed without "some minimum of civilized procedure." *Id.* at 716. Those examples are not exhaustive. *Id.* But the Court made equally clear that "[s]tandard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver." *Id.*

Myrick's waiver was knowing and voluntary. And his appeal does not fall within one of the waiver's express exceptions. His 60-month sentence is below the 84-to-105-month guideline range determined by the district court and well below the statutory maximum of 15 years. The question after *Hunter*, then, is whether the alleged errors underlying Myrick's Guidelines challenges are nevertheless so egregious that enforcing his otherwise valid waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. They are not.

Myrick contends that the district court failed to make adequate findings supporting two disputed guideline enhancements. We have explained that, when a defendant disputes facts material to sentencing, a district court must resolve the dispute with findings sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. *United States v. Reid*, 139 F.3d 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998). But even assuming

without deciding that the district court's findings here were inadequate under that principle, the alleged error is not the kind of extraordinary defect that *Hunter* held was sufficient to overcome an appeal waiver.

Myrick's argument concerns the legal and factual sufficiency of the court's resolution of particular Guidelines issues rather than the absence of the basic procedures necessary to constitute a sentencing proceeding. Myrick received a sentencing hearing, presented his objections to the challenged enhancements, and had the opportunity to argue his position to the district court. The court determined his offense level and criminal-history category, calculated an advisory guideline range, and imposed a sentence. Even if the court erred during this process, an alleged failure to make adequate findings supporting a guideline enhancement is a "standard-fare error[] in misapplying sentencing law" that does not nullify an otherwise enforceable appeal waiver. *Hunter*, 608 U.S. at 716.

The magnitude of the asserted Guidelines disparity does not change that conclusion. Myrick now only challenges two of his enhancements. Even if Myrick was correct that both were erroneously applied, his advisory range only would have been lowered to 46–57 months from 84–105 months. He was ultimately sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment. *Hunter* asks whether enforcement of the waiver in the face of the error would bring the judicial system into disrepute. *See id.* Assuming without deciding that the magnitude of a guidelines error could rise to that level, this modest change in the guideline sentence calculations does not.

Nor does *Hunter* permit us to replace that demanding standard with a more general inquiry into the fairness of enforcing the waiver under all the circumstances. Before the Supreme Court's decision, Myrick relied on decisions from other circuits employing broader or multifactor formulations of a miscarriage-of-justice exception. *Hunter* now supplies the controlling rule. Its standard protects against extraordinary sentencing defects while preserving the ordinary consequences of a defendant's knowing and voluntary decision to relinquish appellate review.

III.

The appeal is **DISMISSED**.