

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the  
United States Court of Appeals  
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-10242

Non-Argument Calendar

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RONALD A. JOSEPH, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

*versus*

STACY JENKINS,  
SGT. POWERS,

Defendants-Appellees,

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Florida  
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cv-02167-SDM-TGW

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Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Joseph, proceeding *pro se*, appeals from the district court's order denying without prejudice his motion to appoint counsel. The appellees move to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because, they argue, the order is not final or otherwise appealable.

We agree that we lack jurisdiction. The district court's order denying Joseph's motion to appoint counsel, which did not end the litigation on the merits, is not a final, appealable order. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1291; *CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City*, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). The order is also not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine because it is not effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. *See Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal*, 22 F.4th 979, 989 (11th Cir. 2022); *Hodges v. Dep't of Corr., State of Ga.*, 895 F.2d 1360, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in a civil Title VII case is not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine); *Fleming v. United States*, 127 F.4th 837, 852 (11th

25-10242

Opinion of the Court

3

Cir. 2025) (“We have also emphasized the ‘narrow,’ ‘limited,’ ‘modest . . . [and] selective’ scope of the collateral-order doctrine.”).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.