

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-11423  
Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00077-LAG

EMMETT L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JUDGE CLAY D. LAND,  
Judge for the U.S. District Court,  
JUDGE GERALD BARD TJOFLAT,  
Circuit Judge,  
JUDGE CHARLES R. WILSON,  
Circuit Judge,  
JUDGE KEVIN C. NEWSOM,  
Circuit Judge,  
JUDGE PETER T. FAY,  
Circuit Judge,  
JUDGE JULIE E. CARNES,  
Circuit Judge,  
BROOKS TRUCKING COMPANY, INC. OF MEMPHIS,  
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,  
RICHARD A. MARCHETTI, Estate of,  
JUDGE WILLIAM C. RUMER,  
Superior Court, Muscogee County, Georgia,  
BROWN & ADAMS, LLC,

CLAYTON M. ADAMS,  
AUSTIN & SPARKS, PC,  
JOHN T. SPARKS, SR.,  
NALL & MILLER, LLP,  
MARK D. LEFKOW,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Georgia

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(June 7, 2021)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JORDAN and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Emmett Williams appeals *pro se* the dismissal of his complaint that his civil rights were violated by state and federal judges, by the President of the United States and the United States of America, and by a trucking company, its insurer, and attorneys involved in Williams's unsuccessful personal injury action. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ruled that Williams's claims about his earlier state lawsuit were barred by *res judicata* and dismissed his claims against the President and the United States for failure to state a claim. Williams argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district judge should have recused herself. He also challenges the dismissal of his claims against the state and federal judges as barred by judicial immunity. We affirm.

The district judge was not required *sua sponte* to recuse herself from Williams's case. A judge must recuse if she "has a personal bias or prejudice either against [the moving party] or in favor of any adverse party," 28 U.S.C. § 144, or if "an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge's impartiality," *Christo v. Padgett*, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455). "Challenges to adverse rulings are generally grounds for appeal, not recusal," *In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.*, 570 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Williams identified no personal bias or prejudice by the district judge that required her recusal. *See United States v. Cerceda*, 188 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Recusal cannot be based on 'unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation.'").

The district court also did not err by dismissing Williams's claims against the state and federal judges. State and federal judges enjoy absolute immunity for acts performed in their judicial capacity. *See Stevens v. Osuna*, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301–02, 1304–07 (11th Cir. 2017). "[A] judge's act is "judicial" for purposes of immunity [when] . . . the act is one normally performed by judges[] and . . . the complaining party was dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity." *Id.* at 1304. Williams alleges that the judges committed fraud and collusion when they ruled against him, but the acts about which Williams complains were undertaken by the judges in their judicial capacities. So the judges are entitled to judicial immunity,

even if their “conduct was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [their] authority.” *See id.* at 1301.

Williams makes no argument about the dismissal of his claims based on res judicata or for failure to state a claim. As a result, he has abandoned any other challenges he could have made to the dismissal of those claims. *See Timson v. Sampson*, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

We **AFFIRM** the dismissal of Williams’s complaint.