FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCU		ITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT APR 21, 2011
ľ	No. 09-13307 Non-Argument Calendar	
D. C. Docke	et No. 06-00064-CR-FTM	- -29-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMER		2) 5111
		Plaintiff-Appellee,
	versus	
LUTHER WAYNE SMITH,		
		Defendant-Appellant.
		-
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida		
	(April 21, 2011)	_
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT		

OF THE UNITED STATES

Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Luther Wayne Smith appealed his 100-month sentence, imposed after resentencing, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This Court affirmed Smith's sentence based on prior precedent. United States v. Smith, 370 F. App'x 59 (11th Cir. 2010). However, the Supreme Court granted Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded Smith's appeal for reconsideration in light of Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). Smith v. United States, ___

On remand for re-sentencing, Smith argued that the district court should consider his post-sentence rehabilitative conduct in determining his new sentence. The district court expressly rejected consideration of Smith's post-sentence rehabilitation in its sentencing calculus, stating that it was prohibited from doing so by this Court's decision in <u>United States v. Lorenzo</u>, 471 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that "post-sentence rehabilitative conduct is an impermissible factor for the district court's consideration" at sentencing). We affirmed on the same grounds.

In <u>Pepper</u>, however, the Supreme Court abrogated this Court's opinion in <u>Lorenzo</u>, and held that

when a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's

postsentencing rehabilitation and . . . such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range.

131 S. Ct. at 1236. <u>Pepper</u> makes clear that a district court may consider post-sentence rehabilitative conduct at re-sentencing.

In light of <u>Pepper</u>, we vacate our prior opinion in this case, <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Smith</u>, 370 F. App'x 59 (11th Cir. 2010), vacate Smith's sentence, and remand for re-sentencing so that the district court may consider Smith's post-sentence rehabilitative conduct as permitted under <u>Pepper</u>.

PRIOR DECISION VACATED; SENTENCE VACATED, and REMANDED.